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Abstract
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of two games—the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift
Game—played within distinct networks (layers) of interdependent networks. In these networks
imitation and interaction between individuals of opposite layers is established through interlinks.
We explore an update rule in which revision of strategies is a biased imitation process: individuals
imitate neighbors from the same layer with probability p, and neighbors from the second layer with
complementary probability 1 − p. We demonstrate that a small decrease of p from p = 1 (which
corresponds to forbidding strategy transfer between layers) is sufficient to promote cooperation in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma subpopulation. This, on the other hand, is detrimental for cooperation
in the Snowdrift Game subpopulation. We provide results of extensive computer simulations for
the case in which layers are modelled as regular random networks, and support this study with
analytical results for coupled well-mixed populations.
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Network science has registered tremendous breakthroughs in the last years. Among these
findings are the development of analytical and computational tools to study large real net-
works, as well as the development of more realistic models. These studies interpreted real
networks mostly as single, isolated entities. However, the deeper understanding of complex
networks is showing that in fact they are generally organized as networks of networks, and
therefore the main focus of scientific research is shifting to multiplex and interdependent
networks [1].
Interdependent networks are organized in two or more layers (subnetworks), in which the
functioning of a node in one layer depends on neighbor nodes in other layers. Multiplex
networks [2, 3], on the other hand, are composed of a single type of node and several
types (“colors”) of links. One example of a real multiplex network is the transportation
network of a city: nodes represent locations in the city, and links are of different type
depending on the transportation system(s) that connect two given locations (metro, autobus,
etc). Interdependent networks have already been applied in studies in diverse areas of
science [4]. There is significant progress in the understanding of their percolation properties
and robustness [1, 5–13]. Furthermore, interdependent networks were also applied in the
evaluation of seismic risk [14, 15], in the emergence of creativity [16] and on the impact of
such population structure on voting outcome [17].
Network science [18–20], together with evolutionary game theory [21], helps to under-
stand how cooperative behavior can emerge and evolve in structured populations of selfish
individuals. Cooperators contribute with a cost so that another individual can receive a
certain benefit. Defectors on the other hand do not contribute, yet reap the benefit (which
we assume to be larger than the cost). Interactions between individuals are traditionally
modelled by one-shot symmetric two-person games, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
[22, 23], the Snowdrift Game (SG) [24] or the Stag-Hunt game (SH) [25]. In structured
populations individuals only interact with their nearest neighbors, and it becomes possible
for cooperators to escape exploitation by defectors by forming clusters in which they support
each other. This process is known as network reciprocity [26–33].
Population structure for games was traditionally modelled as a single, isolated network.
Only very recently research has started to evaluate the impact of more complex, interdepen-
dent networks on the evolution of cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, all previous
works have implemented the same game in all layers [34–40]. Different layers however can
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the population structure. The population is organized in two layers.
Individuals establish intralinks with neighbors of the same layer, and interlinks with neighbors of
the opposite layer. Depending on the layer in which they are located, individuals compute their
payoff taking into account the PD payoff matrix or the SG payoff matrix, indicated on the left of
the figure. On the right, we schematize the relation between the parameters of the two games,
which we use in this paper. We assume that TPD = TSG = T , SSG = S and SPD = −S, with
S ∈ [0, 1], T ∈ [1, 2].
represent distinct environments, characterized by their game rules, which can interact or be
coupled. Consider the example of two companies and the joint network of contacts between
their employees. The code of conduct in each company may be different, depending on its
internal organization and goals. Nevertheless, employees from one company may interact
with employees from the other company, because they know each other personally or for in-
stance when establishing a business transaction. By interacting with an acquaintance from
the other company, each employee can acquire new working strategies, which can afterwards
be imitated by their contacts inside each company. Another natural example is interaction
between subpopulations of different cultural backgrounds.
Here we investigate how imitation and interaction between individuals playing different
games influence the final cooperation levels. For that, we consider a population organized
in two layers of equal size, in which one distinct game is played in each of the layers,
as schematized in Fig. 1 (see also Methods for details). Nodes establish intralinks with
neighbors of the same layer, and interlinks with neighbors of the opposite layer. In the
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following, we start by studying by computer simulations the case in which both layers
are regular random graphs. Afterwards, we also consider the limit case of a well-mixed
population of infinite size, also organized in two layers. We introduce bias in imitation:
individuals imitate a neighbor from the same layer with probability p, or a neighbor of the
opposite layer with probability (1− p). We investigate the impact of varying p on the final
level of cooperation reached in each of the layers (see Methods).
I. RESULTS
A. Regular random layers
For reference, we present in Fig. 2 the final fraction of cooperators for the PD and the SG
played in isolated populations. Panel A) shows the results of computer simulations in regular
random networks, while panel B) shows the stationary solutions of the replicator equation
x˙ = x (1− x) [fC(x) − fD(x)] for an infinite well-mixed population, that is a population in
which every individual has the same probability of interacting with anyone else [41]. In the
replicator equation, x represents the fraction of cooperators in the population, fC(x) and
fD(x) stand for the mean fitness of cooperators and defectors respectively (with fC(x) =
xR + (1 − x)S and fD = xT + (1 − x)P ). The PD is the harshest social dilemma for
cooperation, and therefore only a small region characterized by S close to 0 and T close to
1 is able to escape full defection, in regular random networks. The SG, on the other hand,
is a coexistence game, in which the final fraction of cooperators x in an infinite well-mixed
population is given by x = (P − S)/(R− S − T + P ).
To evaluate the impact of an interdependence between the PD and the SG on the evo-
lution of cooperation, we start by considering a population in which each of the layers is
modeled by a regular random graph with nodes of degree k = 4. This graph has no finite
loops in the infinite size limit. We assume that each node establishes one interlink with a
uniformly randomly chosen node from the opposite layer. That is, individuals engage in four
interactions with neighbors of the same layer and one interaction with a neighbor from the
other layer.
The contour plots in Fig. 3 show the result of our simulations, namely, the final fraction of
cooperators in each of the layers as a function of the game parameters T and S, for several
4
FIG. 2: Final fraction of cooperators in single, isolated populations. The contour plot
of panel A) shows the final average fraction of cooperators for the PD and SG when these social
dilemmas are played in an isolated regular random network of size N = 103 and node degree
k = 4. Panel B) shows the corresponding results for an infinite well-mixed population, solution
of the replicator equation x˙ = x (1− x) [fC (x) − fD (x)], where fC(x) and fD(x) stand for the
mean fitness of cooperators and defectors respectively[41]. Red corresponds to full defection, blue
corresponds to full cooperation. The parameter β is set to 1.0 for panel A).
biased imitation probabilities p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1). When p = 1 individuals can only imitate
neighbors from the same layer, and the results obtained are qualitatively similar to those
known for isolated populations (see panel A) of Fig. 2).
When p < 1 strategy transfer between layers becomes possible. Comparing the results for
the PD layer for p = 0.9, p = 0.95 and p = 1, we reach an interesting conclusion: although
the fraction of cooperators is still low, even a small probability of imitating a neighbor
playing a distinct social dilemma (in this case, the SG) is sufficient to prevent full defection
in the majority of the PD quadrant.
As p further decreases, for a given pair of game parameters T, S the fraction of cooperators
in the stationary state becomes approximately equal in both layers (note that SSG = S, SPD =
−S with S ∈ [0, 1]). However, a careful inspection of the contour plots presented in Fig. 3
for 0.1 ≤ p ≤ 0.5 shows that the fraction of cooperators in both layers is not exactly identical
(i.e. the contours are not exactly symmetrical): for a fixed pair of T and S values, the PD
layer tends to have a slightly lower fraction of cooperators.
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FIG. 3: Final fraction of cooperators when layers are modelled as random regular
graphs, for various values of probability p. Contour plots show the final average fraction of
cooperators on both the PD (S < 0) and SG (S > 0) layers as a function of the game parameters T
and S, starting from 50% of cooperators and defectors randomly distributed in each of the layers.
The dashed line separates the results for the SG layer (upper quadrants) from the results for the
PD layer (lower quadrants). Red corresponds to full defection, blue corresponds to full cooperation
(x stands for the fraction of cooperators in a given layer).
Finally, the results for p = 0 are surprisingly different from the ones for higher p. This
contrast indicates the different structures of absorbing states at different values of p. When
p = 1 four absorbing states exist, and both layers reach homogeneous states: both reaching
full defection (full cooperation), or one layer reaching full cooperation and the other full
defection (and vice versa). When 0 < p < 1, individuals can imitate neighbors from both
layers, and therefore only the two absorbing states in which both layers reach the same
homogeneous state are possible. In contrast, when p = 0, each individual can only imitate
his neighbor connected through the interlink. As a result, there is an infinite number of
absorbing states. When all interlinks connect pairs of individuals with equal strategies,
evolution stops, as schematized in panel A) of Fig. 4. Since strategies and interlinks are
distributed randomly in the population, on average less than N/2 interlinks will actually
connect individuals of different strategies, and the population will rapidly evolve to an
absorbing state.
Figure 5 shows the cross section of the contour plots of Fig. 3 at fixed S = 0.5 for several p
values. This illustrates the different behavior of the level of cooperation in each of the layers
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FIG. 4: Absorbing states for p = 0. Each panel represents a snapshot of the two layers seen
in profile. Panel A) schematizes one possible absorbing state when layers are modelled as regular
random networks. Since each individual can only imitate his neighbor connected through the
interlink, the population reaches an absorbing state organized as an arbitrary set of independent
pairs (cooperator–cooperator and defector–defector) in which one member is in one layer and the
other is in the other layer. Panel B) represents one of the two possible absorbing states in a well-
mixed population. Since each node establishes interlinks to every node from the opposite layer,
evolution ceases when both layers reach full cooperation or full defection.
for decreasing p. Excluding the results for p = 0 (which are a direct consequence of allowing
exactly one interlink for each node) we observe that the fraction of cooperators monotonously
decreases for decreasing p in the SG layer, while in the PD layer it monotonously increases.
As we will see in the following, this behavior will not be maintained when this population
structure is replaced by a well-mixed population.
B. Well-mixed population
We now proceed to analyze the general case of a population modelled by a fully connected
network organized in two layers. Each layer has N/2 nodes and 1
2
(N/2)(N/2− 1) intralinks.
Contrary to the previous case of regular random layers, in which each node established one
interlink, we now assume that each node establishes N/2 interlinks to the N/2 nodes of the
opposite layer, in accordance with the structure of a fully connected network. Therefore,
each node has N − 1 neighbors: N/2− 1 in the same layer as itself, and N/2 in the opposite
layer. nPD and nSG stand for the number of cooperators in the PD (SG) layer, respectively.
In this case, mean-field theory is exact and the evolution of population can be expressed
7
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FIG. 5: Final fraction of cooperators versus T at fixed S = 0.5, for both layers. Results
correspond to those presented in Fig. 3 when S = 0.5. The fraction of cooperators for the SG layer
is shown in the upper plot, while the corresponding curves for the PD layer are presented in the
bottom plot. For simplicity, we include only some of the p values studied in Fig. 3.
completely by nPD (t) and nSG (t).
We obtain the solutions for the stationary state of this model in the infinite population
limit, N → ∞. For that, we adopted the variables xPD = nPD/(N/2) and xSG = nSG/(N/2)
(xPD ∈ [0, 1] and xSG ∈ [0, 1]). The mean fitness of individuals in each of the layers is ex-
pressed in terms of the game parameters and the fraction of cooperators and defectors. In
the PD layer, the fitnesses of cooperators (fC,PD) and defectors (fD,PD) are expressed as:
fC,PD = xPD − (1− xPD)S + xSG − (1− xSG)S, (1)
fD,PD = xPDT + xSGT. (2)
Similarly, in the SG layer the fitnesses of cooperators (fC,SG) and defectors (fD,SG) are
fC,SG = xSG + (1− xSG)S + xPD + (1− xPD)S, (3)
fD,SG = xSGT + xPDT. (4)
We obtain the following rate equations for the evolution of the fraction of cooperators in the
8
FIG. 6: Final fraction of cooperators on each layer of the well-mixed population, for
various values of probability p. Contour plots show the final fraction of cooperators on both
the PD (S < 0) and SG (S > 0) layers (solution of Eqs. (S1) and (S2)) as a function of the game
parameters T and S. The dashed line separates the results for the SG layer (upper quadrants) from
the results for the PD layer (lower quadrants). Red corresponds to full defection, blue corresponds
to full cooperation (x stands for the fraction of cooperators in a given layer). Parameters: β = 1.0.
PD and SG layers:
x˙PD = (1− xPD) [pxPDF (fC,PD − fD,PD) + (1− p)xSGF (fC,SG − fD,PD)]
− xPD [p (1− xPD)F (fD,PD − fC,PD) + (1− p) (1− xSG)F (fD,SG − fC,PD)] , (5)
x˙SG = (1− xSG) [pxSGF (fC,SG − fD,SG) + (1− p)xPDF (fC,PD − fD,SG)]
− xSG [p (1− xSG)F (fD,SG − fC,SG) + (1− p) (1− xPD)F (fD,PD − fC,SG)] . (6)
For instance, in Eq. (S1) the factor (1− xPD) stands for the probability of selecting a defector
from the PD layer. The second factor, in the square brackets, accounts for the two possible
scenarios: with probability p the defector can imitate a cooperator from the PD layer, while
with complementary probability (1− p) the defector can imitate a cooperator that belongs
to the SG layer. The interpretation is analogous for the second line of this equation, as well
as for Eq. (S2). The stationary state solution corresponds to that obtained from Eqs. (S1)
and (S2) when x˙PD = 0 and x˙SG = 0.
Figure 6 shows the final stationary states of this mean-field model for different values of
probability p, provided by the numerical solutions of Eqs. (S1) and (S2) for β = 1.0. These
plots actually explain our simulations in the previous section for coupled regular random
9
networks (see Fig. 3). One can clearly see that Figs. 3 and 6 show qualitative similarities,
with only one dramatic exception, p = 0, which will be discussed below. In particular, in
the case of p = 1 both Figs. 3 and 6, as well as Figs. 5 and 7, are close to the corresponding
results for isolated populations (random regular and well-mixed, respectively, compare with
Fig. 2).
One can see from Fig. 6 that a small probability of imitating a neighbor from the SG
layer is beneficial for the levels of cooperation reached in the PD layer. The final fraction
of cooperators in each of the layers becomes approximately equal as p decreases, yielding
almost symmetrical contours for 0.1 ≤ p ≤ 0.5. However, the fraction of cooperators is in
general slightly lower in the PD layer than in the SG layer for a fixed pair of game parameters
T and S.
Note some difference between Figs. 3 and 6 at sufficiently low, still non-zero, p. With
diminishing p, the region of full defection in coupled regular random populations (Fig. 3)
approaches some limit. In contrast, for decreasing p, coupled well-mixed populations (Fig. 6)
do not show any area with full defection, but the region with high level of defection becomes
wider and wider as p decreases. Finally, at p = 0, the full defection state is realized in
the entire T − S plane. This difference is also observed between Figs. 5 and 7. Especially
it manifests itself in two different behaviors of fractions of cooperators in the PD layer in
Figs. 5 and 7, monotonous with p and non-monotonous, respectively.
At p = 0 the difference between the coupled regular random networks and well-mixed
population is dramatic. While for the coupled well-mixed populations, the final state is
full defection for the whole T − S plane (Fig. 6), for regular random networks we observed
coexistence of defection and cooperation for the whole T − S plane. The reason for this
controversy is the fundamental difference between the structures of the absorbing states in
these two systems. Clearly, in the mean-field system (well-mixed) there are two absorbing
states: full cooperation and full defection. For p = 0, the full defection scenario is realized.
In contrast, in the coupled regular random populations, at p = 0 the system has an infinite
number of absorbing states. We already explained that this state is organized as an arbitrary
set of independent pairs (cooperator-cooperator and defector-defector) in which one member
is in one layer and the other is in the other layer. The final fraction of cooperators and
defectors in the population for a given point on the T − S plane is determined by a specific
initial condition.
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FIG. 7: Final fraction of cooperators versus T at fixed S = 0.5 for both layers of a fully
connected network. Results correspond to those presented in Fig. 6 when S = 0.5. The fraction
of cooperators for the SG layer is shown in the upper plot, while the corresponding curves for the
PD layer are shown in the bottom plot.
It is interesting to relate our findings with observations in other works [39, 40] which
studied the role of biased fitness (utility) on the level of cooperation in interdependent
structured populations. Although these works explored a bias and network architectures
very different from our study, they reported the existence of an optimal control parameter
value for cooperation, similarly to what we notice for a well-mixed population.
We can also relate our model to the multi-network model [42, 43], where links between
nodes are of two sorts: the interaction links through which individuals play and the imitation
links through which individuals revise their strategies. All links in our model are used
both for interaction and imitation. The principal difference is that interaction occurs with
probability 1 for every link, while imitation takes place with probability p along intralinks
and the complementary probability 1− p along interlinks.
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II. DISCUSSION
We explored the evolution of cooperation in two games—the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Snowdrift Game—played within an interdependent network. We demonstrated that
as the probability to imitate neighbors from the opposite layer increases, the final level of
cooperation in each of the layers behaves differently. A small probability 1 − p is always
detrimental for the level of cooperation in the SG layer, regardless of the population structure
(well-mixed or when layers are modelled as regular random networks). In the case of a well-
mixed population we observed an intermediate optimal value of p for which the fraction
of cooperators in the steady state is maximal in the PD quadrant. On the other hand,
when layers are regular random graphs, the level of cooperation in the PD layer registers
a significant increase from full defection as p decreases from 1, as is shown in Fig. 3. We
have also shown that different arrangements of interconnections between layers result in
fundamentally different structures of absorbing states for p = 0, that is the limit case in
which individuals can only imitate neighbors through the interlinks.
The constraint between the game parameters of the PD and the SG implemented in this
work is one of possible options. Based on our mean-field approach we have verified that our
conclusions remain qualitatively valid for other relationships between game parameters [44].
In this work we studied a representative case of β = 1. In the Supplementary Information
we consider other values of β.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game are two of the possible two-person
games. Future research directions include establishing an interdependence between other
two- and N -person games, as well as extending the biased imitation process here reported
to the case in which layers are strongly heterogeneous, such as scale-free networks [45].
III. METHODS
Evolutionary games. We implement standard two-person games. Each individual can
act as an unconditional cooperator (C) or as an unconditional defector (D). The possible
12
payoffs resulting from the interaction between two players are resumed in the payoff matrix

C D
C R S
D T P
 (7)
in which the entries represent the payoff earned by the row player. When both individuals
opt for cooperation (defection), they both receive a Reward, R (Punishment, P ). When a
cooperator meets a defector, the cooperative player received the Sucker’s payoff (S), while
the defective player receives the Temptation (T ) for defecting.
The relative ordering of the game parameters R, S, T and P defines four different two-
person games [46]. In this study, we consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (characterized
by T > R > P > S) [23] and the Snowdrift Game (SG) (characterized by T > R > S > P )
[24]. We fix R = 1, P = 0 as is conventional [26].
Population structure. We consider a population organized in two layers (schematized
in Fig. 1), in which each node represents a different individual. In each layer all individuals
play the same game, the PD in one layer and the SG in the other. We refer to links between
nodes of opposite layers as interlinks, and links between nodes of the same layer as intralinks.
In the absence of interlinks, each layer stands as an isolated population in which one single
game is played. When layers are modelled as regular random graphs, we assume that each
node establishes one interlink to a randomly chosen node from the opposite layer. On the
other hand, when studying a two-layer fully connected network, we assume that each node
establishes interlinks to each of the nodes in the opposite layer.
Relation between game parameters. We assume that individuals in the PD layer
adopt the game parameters RPD, SPD, TPD and PPD (with TPD > RPD > PPD > SPD). Similarly,
individuals in the SG layer consider RSG, SSG, TSG and PSG (with TSG > RSG > SSG > PSG).
The game parameters for the PD and the SG can be related in several ways. We opt for
RPD = RSG = 1, PPD = PSG = 0 and TPD = TSG = T with T ∈ [1, 2]. Furthermore, we
constrained SSG = S and SPD = −S, with S ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting payoff matrix for the SG
is

C D
C 1 S
D T 0
 (8)
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while the payoff matrix for the PD layer is given by

C D
C 1 −S
D T 0
. (9)
The difference between matrix (8) for the SG layer and matrix (9) for the PD layer is in
the payoff obtained by a cooperator when interacting with a defector, the sucker’s payoff.
When interacting with a defector, a cooperator located in the SG layer earns S, while a
cooperator located in the PD layer earns −S. We stress that this is only one of possible
relations between the parameters of the two games.
Individuals play the same game with all neighbors, including the neighbor(s) from the
other layer. An individual’s fitness represents a measure of his success, and corresponds to
the payoff accumulated over all interactions in which he engages in one time-step. Through
the interlinks, individuals obtain their payoff by taking into account the strategy of their
co-player and the payoff matrix used in their own layer.
Update dynamics. Individuals revise their strategies through a biased imitation pro-
cess: with probability p they imitate a neighbor from the same layer, while with probability
(1− p) individuals imitate a neighbor from the opposite layer. Update is asynchronous:
at each time-step we randomly choose one of the layers, and from it one randomly chosen
individual, A, to revise his strategy. Then we choose with probability p a neighbor from
the same layer, and with complimentary probability (1− p), a neighbor from the opposite
layer. If A and his chosen neighbor, B, have different strategies, A imitates the strategy of
B with a probability F (fB − fA) proportional to their fitness difference and given by the
Fermi distribution [47, 48],
F (fB − fA) = 1
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
. (10)
fA (fB) stands for the fitness of A (B), and β represents the intensity of selection, which
regulates the accuracy of the imitation process. In the limit β → 0 evolution proceeds by
random drift, while β →∞ corresponds to the deterministic limit of pure copying dynamics:
A imitates B iff fB > fA, with probability 1. We consider the respresentative case of β = 1.0.
Simulations. The results of Figs. 3 and 5 were obtained for a population of total size
N = 2000, in which both layers had an equal size, N/2 = 1000. Each point in the contour
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plots corresponds to an average over 103 trials. In each trial, we start by randomly selecting
one over 102 realizations of a regular random network to model each layer, and establish
N/2 interlinks between the layers. Each interlink is established by uniformly randomly
choosing two end nodes, one from each layer, allowing each node to establish exactly one
interlink. Each trial starts by randomly distributing 50% of cooperators and defectors in
each of the layers. We allow the population to evolve for 104 generations (where 1 generation
corresponds to N/2 strategy revisions), after which we average the fraction of cooperators
over the next 103 generations.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
In the main text we focused on the case of β = 1. In particular, for this value of
β, we considered a fully connected network organized in two layers. In this Supplementary
Information we provide additional results for other β values for this easily treatable network,
which demonstrate that the value β = 1 is representative. We present the rate equations in
the specific case p = 1, for which the results in the steady state prove to be independent of β.
Furthermore, we show detailed numerical results for p < 1, which depend on the particular
β value chosen.
S I. WELL-MIXED POPULATIONS: RESULTS FOR VARIOUS β VALUES
For p = 1, Eqs. (5) and (6) in the main text simplify to
x˙PD = xPD (1− xPD) tanh
[
β
2
(fC,PD − fD,PD)
]
(S1)
x˙SG = xSG (1− xSG) tanh
[
β
2
(fC,SG − fD,SG)
]
(S2)
The steady state solution of Eqs. (S1) and (S2), assuming x˙PD = 0 and x˙SG = 0, is indepen-
dent of β.
For p < 1, on the other hand, Eqs. (5) and (6) in the main text cannot be simplified in
the same way as Eqs. (S1) and (S2), and their steady state solutions depend on the chosen
β value. In Supplementary Fig. S1 we present the fraction of cooperations in the steady
state for three β values, β = 0.1, 1.0, and 10. Here the diagrams for β = 1.0 are represented
from Fig. 6 in the main text.
Comparing the results shown for the various β values, we observe that the final level of
cooperation shows the same qualitative behavior discussed in the main text regardless of
the β value. That is, the fraction of cooperators monotonously decreases with decreasing p
in the SG layer, and there is an optimal p value for the level of cooperation in the PD layer.
As β increases from β = 0.1, there is a shift in that optimal p value: for β = 0.1 it is close
to p = 0.9, while on the other hand for β = 10 it is close to p = 0.25. That is, the optimal
p value for the level of cooperation in the PD layer decreases for increasing β.
The results are also independent of the β value adopted for p = 0: the population always
reaches full defection in both layers.
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FIG. S1: Final fraction of cooperators on each layer of the well-mixed population for
various β values. Contour plots show the final fraction of cooperators x on both the PD (S < 0)
and SG (S > 0) layers as a function of T and S, for β = 0.1 (first row), β = 1 (second row) and
β = 10 (third row). The results for β = 1 are reproduced from the main text for easier comparison.
The dashed line separates the results for the SG layer (upper quadrants) from the results for the
PD layer (lower quadrants). Red corresponds to full defection, blue corresponds to full cooperation.
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